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1. INTRODUCTION 
EU executive rule-making, as a phenomenon distinct from law-making tout court, has 
been the subject of significant institutional and academic discussion in EU law. The 
distinction between ‘measures directly based on the Treaty itself’ and ‘derived law 
intended to ensure their implementation’ animated since the 1970s the debate on the 
legal and institutional limits of implementing acts, including on the relative competence 
of the Council and of the Commission in this respect.1 Since the Lisbon Treaty, with its 
new scheme of delegated and implementing acts – distinct from legislative acts in the 
sense of Article 289(3) TFEU – much of the discussion has shifted to the distinction 
between these two types of acts, an issue which recent Court judgments have not 
clarified.2  
EU executive rule-making is far from being limited to the acts now recognized 
in the Treaty. In a broad sense, it includes all non-legislative acts of general application 
that produce external effects by concretizing the content of Treaty provisions or 
legislative acts and defining the criteria for the regulation of specific cases.3 Formally, 
                                                        
1  Judgment in Case 25/70 Einfuhr - und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v Köster 
EU:C:1970:115. 
2 Thus far, Biocides remains the landmark case: Judgment in C-427/12 Commission v Parliament and 
Council (Biocides) EU:C:2014:170. 
3 This definition relies on the ReNEUAL Model Rules on EU Administrative Procedure – Book II 
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acts of general application adopted directly on the basis of the Treaty outside of 
legislative procedures are executive rule-making. Guidelines, plans, publicly 
recognized private standards can also fall within this category. Insofar as they produce 
external effects, these different types of acts have in common the capacity to impact on 
rights and legally protected interests of natural and legal persons, as well as the ability 
to shape the acts of other public entities. EU law has developed a set of constitutional 
and legal principles that ought to frame the way in which executive rules are made, in 
view of the external effects that they produce, beyond the definition of inter-
institutional relations or the division of tasks or collaboration between the EU 
institutions and Member States.  
This chapter starts by pointing out that, for institutional reasons specific to the 
EU, executive rule-making has been conceived in a way that ignored the structuring 
and control functions of administrative procedures. It continues by mapping the scope 
and nature of executive rule-making, as well as the various forms it can take. These 
indicate the varied and extensive use that the EU institutions and bodies make of 
executive rule-making. This variety poses difficulties for a single set of procedural rules 
governing executive rule-making (Section 2). Despite these difficulties, it is argued that 
the Treaty provisions on democracy, in particular Articles 9 and 11 TFEU, would 
require a systematic consideration of how the principles of transparency and 
participation – constitutionally framed as dimensions of democracy – should imbue the 
exercise of authority that executive rule-making represents. How much of a challenge 
this normative claim represents largely depends on how legal rules on access to 
                                                        
(Administrative Rulemaking), Article II-1(1) (available at 
http://www.reneual.eu/publications/ReNEUAL%20Model%20Rules%202014/Book%20II%20-
%20Administrative%20Rulemaking_individualized_final%202014_09_03.pdf) and on D Curtin, H 
Hoffman, J Mendes, ‘Constitutionalising EU Executive Rule-Making Procedures: A Research Agenda’ 
(2013) 19 ELJ 1, 2. 
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documents, reason-giving and careful examination, and institutional practices of 
participation (which largely fill in the absence of legal rules) apply to executive rule-
making (Section 3). They may contribute to structure the discretion of those who make 
executive rules and the relationship between the authors of these rules and legally 
affected persons and citizens. However, the chapter argues that the case law on access 
to documents and on participation may be entrenching the way the Commission shapes 
rule-making, rather than developing ways of structuring those procedures in view of 
the Treaty provisions on democracy. It discusses also the role that a possible law on the 
administrative procedure could have in this regard and the obstacles to including rule-
making in such a law (Section 4).  
2. MAPPING EU EXECUTIVE RULE-MAKING  
(a) Differentiation, Institutional Focus, and Proceduralization 
Rule-making procedures – with some exceptions – have been approached in EU law 
largely as a matter for the institutions, of the way they relate to each other and to the 
Member States. When formalized, they are predominantly directed at combining the 
intervention of institutions, agencies, and committees, in a way that is, first, compatible 
with the Treaty, second, consonant with the interpretation that each institution has of 
its institutional prerogatives under the Treaty, and third, heedful of the involvement of 
the national administrations that implement the rules adopted (as well as the 
participation of interested legal persons, mostly via consultations and advisory 
groups).4 In other words, rule-making procedures have been mostly conceived outside 
the remit of the controls that administrative law would typically provide. 
                                                        
4 See further, J Mendes, ‘The Making of Delegated and Implementing Acts: Legitimacy Beyond Inter-
Institutional Balances’ in CF Bergström and D Ritleng (eds) Rule-making by the European Commission: 
The New System (OUP 2016). 
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The focus on the relative powers of the institutions and of the Member States 
has its genesis in the institutional struggles that have characterized subordinate 
legislation since the inception of EU integration. The founding Treaties did not 
differentiate between legal acts adopted directly on their basis and ‘derived’ legal acts 
(i.e. those that implement the acts of the institutions and on the basis of which they are 
enacted).5 Nevertheless, institutional practice (endorsed by the Court) soon determined 
the need for an additional layer of regulation, for reasons similar to delegation of 
powers in national legal systems.6 These were the origins of implementing acts adopted 
via comitology procedures.  
The conferral of powers of the Council in the Commission disrupted an 
institutional system that had been designed to balance the two institutions – one 
‘intergovernmental’, the other ‘supranational’ – that were at the time the motor of 
European integration.7 The differentiation between ‘the measures directly based on the 
Treaty itself and derived law intended to ensure their implementation’ 8  entailed 
different procedures, which represented an institutional arrangement different from the 
one established in the Treaty for the adoption of primary acts. The institutional struggles 
that have characterized comitology since the outset have generated different settlements 
at different points in time, culminating in the current Treaty distinction between 
delegated and implementing acts.9 
                                                        
5 Despite Article 155, 4th indent of the Treaty of Rome (the Commission would ‘exercise the powers 
conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of the rules laid down by the latter’). 
6 C Bertram, ‘Decision-Making in the E.E.C.: the Management Committee Procedure’ 1968) 5 CML 
Rev 246; Case 23/75 Rey Soda v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero [1975] ECR 1279 at [11]. 
7 E Noël, ‘Comment fonctionnent les institutions de la Communauté Economique Européenne’ (1963) 6 
Revue du Marché Commun 14, 15. On comitology see, among many others, CF Bergström, Comitology: 
Delegation of Powers in the European Union and the Committee System (OUP 2005). 
8 Case 25/70 Köster, [6]; Rey Soda, [12]. On the possible consequences of such power vis-à-vis private 
parties, see Judgment in Case 5/77Tedeschi v Denkavit EU:C:1977:144, [51]–[57]. 
9 See, inter alia, Bergström (n 7) 308–63; P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty. Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform 
(OUP 2010) 48–66. 
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This institutional perspective has relinquished other important functions that 
procedures could have in ensuring the legitimacy of executive rule-making. Apart from 
determining and organizing the relative powers and duties of the various entities 
involved in decision-making, procedures also rationalize public action in ways that go 
beyond the logic of the relative competences of the participating entities. They enable 
the management of information required to adopt decisions and structure the scope of 
available options, inter alia, by enabling the weighing of competing public interests in 
view of those that, by force of a Treaty or legislative provision, should be pursued in 
each instance.10 In addition, they structure the relationships between decision-makers, 
legally affected persons and citizens. They provide access points to citizens and persons 
affected, be it in the form of access to information or access to decision-making. They 
ensure the impartiality of decision-making and the control of the choices made via 
reason-giving requirements. Some of these dimensions are not absent from EU 
executive rule-making, by force of general principles of law and Treaty rules (in the 
case of reason-giving). Yet, the way such general principles do apply to EU executive 
rule-making, if at all, is not always clear.11  
As the above indicates, the relatively marginal role that rules of the 
administrative procedure play in the horizontal regulation of executive rule-making in 
the EU may be explained both by the specific features of the EU polity (in particular 
the lack, until recently, of an explicit constitutional differentiation between an executive 
and a legislative function) and by the specific way in which executive rule-making 
evolved therein. Nevertheless, these specificities should not overshadow the normative 
discussion on the possibilities to develop a procedural framework that would structure 
                                                        
10 See, inter alia, Curtin, Hoffman and Mendes (n 3) 3–4 and the references made therein. The argument 
made here is also developed in Mendes (n 4); Case 25/70. 
11 See Section 3, below. 
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rule-making in ways that go beyond the inter-institutional concerns and vertical 
divisions of executive power that are characteristic of the EU.12 Executive rule-making 
is a central feature of the EU political system, not least given the wide scope of issues 
that may be regulated in this way. 
(b) Scope and Nature 
The blurred line between what should be regulated in legislative acts and what may be 
delegated to executive rule-making is indicative of the breadth of matters that may be 
regulated via executive rule-making. Reflecting previous case law, the Treaty now 
‘reserves’ to legislative acts the regulation of the ‘essential elements of an area’.13 The 
question is what are these essential elements. 
In the Schengen Borders Code case, the Court indicated that essential elements 
refer to ‘political choices falling within the responsibilities of the European Union 
legislature’. 14  The Court did not imply that all ‘political choices’ pertain to the 
competence of the legislator. In a circular way, it indicated that it should be for the EU 
legislator to rule on those political choices that fall within its responsibility. While not 
clarifying what such political choices would be, the Court gave three important 
indications. First, the determination of what is ‘essential’ must be based on objective 
factors subject to review of the Court, in view of the particularities of the domain 
concerned.15 Secondly, those choices may qualify as essential insofar as they entail an 
                                                        
12 See Section 3(a) below.  
13 Art 290(1) TFEU. See, further, J-P Jacqué, ‘Introduction: Pouvoir législative et pouvoir exécutive dans 
l’Union Européenne’ in J-B Auby et J de la Rochère, Droit Administratif Européen (Bruylant 2007) 25–
48; C Blumann, ‘A la frontière de la fonction législative et de la fonction exécutive: les ‘nouveaux’ actes 
délégués’ in Chemins d’Europe. Mélanges En L’honneur de Jean-Paul Jacqué (Dalloz 2010) 127–44. 
14  Case C-355/10 Parliament v Council EU:C:2012:516, [65]. This judgment was issued after the 
adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, but still under the previous Treaty rules. In a sense, it makes the 
transition between the previous case law and the Lisbon scheme of non-legislative acts. 
15 Ibid, [67, 68]. 
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assessment of conflicting interests.16 Third, provisions that contend with fundamental 
rights to a significant extent also require the involvement of the EU legislature.17 By 
underlining that implementing powers relate ‘only to certain detailed practical rules’, 
as specified in the applicable rules, the Court appeared to create a fairly broad reserve 
for the EU legislator.18 Often, ‘detailed practical rules’ are equated with technical 
matters, in particular with regard to implementing acts.19 
Yet, the distinction between ‘political choices’ and ‘detailed practical [or 
technical] rules’ is deceptive, as the Court has also acknowledged. In Europol, it ruled 
that decisions entailing ‘certain compromises with technical and political dimensions’ 
may not qualify as ‘political choices falling within the responsibilities of the European 
Union legislature’, provided that the EU legislator has defined the principle guiding 
such choices, the objectives to be pursued and the legal framework within which such 
decisions ought to be made.20 Also when assessing whether the Commission stayed 
within the limits of its implementing powers, the Court refers to the general aims 
defined by the EU legislator.21 Perhaps surprisingly, in view of the Schengen Borders 
Code and of the data protection issues at stake in Europol, the Court held in Europol 
that the potential impact on fundamental rights was not sufficient to determine a reserve 
of the legislator.22 
The fact that the Court has endorsed the legality of implementing acts defining 
the temporary suspension of third countries from the list of tcountries whose nationals 
                                                        
16 Ibid, [76]. 
17 Ibid, [77]. 
18 Ibid [72]. 
19 See, e.g., the allegations of the Parliament in EURES, [32]; the allegations of the Commission in 
Judgment in C-88/14 Commission v Parliament, EU:C:2015:499, [21]. 
20 Case C-363/14 Parliament v Council EU:C:2015:579, [51] (see also [50]). 
21 Case C-65/13Parliament v Commission EU:C:2014:2289, [48]–[58] and [59 et seq]. 
22 Case C-363/14 Parliament v Council, [52]. And see E Tauschinsky, ‘SBC (C-355/10) vs Europol (C-
363/14): What does the Court do with fundamental rights and essential elements?’ on the ACELG blog 
for 2015/09/24. 
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are exempted from visa requirements and the list of third countries with which Europol 
may conclude international agreements should at the very least guard against too quick 
assumptions regarding the technical nature of this category of non-legislative acts.23  
(c) A Varied Spectrum of Forms and Authors 
As much as institutional practice led to differentiating legal acts adopted on the basis 
of the Treaty and legal acts that implement them (in a broad sense), it also gave rise to 
a wide variety of forms of executive rule-making. In a broad sense, these include 
Council regulations in the area of anti-dumping, and acts adopted by the Commission 
directly on the basis of the Treaty.24 Quite different phenomena are private regulatory 
acts. Privately set product standards may acquire the authority of a public act in 
schemes such as the ‘new approach to harmonisation’ (e.g. via presumptions of 
conformity, or recognition and incorporation into legal acts of the institutions and 
bodies). They too convey the distinction between the realm of law-making, where 
essential requirements are set, and the realm of technical stipulations, defined via 
distinct procedures and institutional arrangements, which, in this case, arguably 
coalesce private autonomy and public authority. 25  They involve more than just 
implementation or concretization of political choices made by the Council and the 
Parliament, which may explain the stress put on the openness and transparency of these 
rule-making processes.26  
                                                        
23 See, respectively, the acts at issue in C-88/14 Commission v Parliament EU:C:2015:499 and in Case 
C-363/14 Parliament v Council above.  
24 See, e.g., Arts 43(3) TFEU and 108(4) TFEU and Art 126(9) TFEU (although addressed to a Member 
State). 
25  H Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance. Product Standards in the Regulation of 
Integrating Markets (Hart Publishing 2005) 4–5, 65 (further, 58–75, on the role of product standards and 
on how they are incorporated in EU law, and 227–46 on the ‘new approach’). 
26 Ibid at 254–57. See Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012, OJ L 316 (14.11.2012). 
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Rule-making may also come in the form of communications, guidelines, 
frameworks, notices, recommendations, insofar as these may contain or generate 
normative criteria of decision-making. They may do so by indicating how the EU 
institutions or bodies interpret EU law (and would, therefore, enforce it), which course 
of action they intend to take on a given matter, or how Member States should coordinate 
their implementing actions. Such informal acts have a prominent role in EU law, which 
varies according to policy area. In particular (but not exclusively) in the area of state 
aids, guidance has also allowed the Commission to define and develop its own policy.27 
Guidance may also occupy the normative space left open by framework norms, serving 
the uniform application of EU law in ways that largely exceed the interpretation of 
legislative norms.28 
The ability of such informal acts to generate external effects is not always clear. 
The EU Courts have recognized that informality does not equate with lack of legal 
effects. The publication of guidelines defining a course of action may have a self-
binding effect on the Commission, insofar as they define rules from which it cannot 
deviate at the risk of breaching general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the 
protection of legitimate expectations. As a result, the Commission may only depart 
from them by giving reasons that justify deviation and safeguard those principles.29 
                                                        
27 See, e.g., and for an early account, Melchior ‘Les communications de la Commission, contribution à 
l’étude des actes communautaires non prévus par les traités’ in P Teitgen (ed), Mélanges Fernand 
Dehousse, vol. II, La construction européenne (F Nathan 1979) 249–50. On the use of guidelines in state 
aid, see, e.g., G della Cananea, ‘Administration by Guidelines: the Policy Guidelines of the Commission 
in the Field of State Aids’ in I Harden (ed), State Aid: Community Law and Policy (Bundesanzeiger 
1993) 61–75.More generally, see O Stefan, Soft Law in Court: Competition Law, State Aid and the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (Kluwer 2013). 
28 For an early account, see Melchior (n 27). See also J Scott, ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-Legislative Guidance 
as a Challenge for European Administrative Law’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 329. For an example, see e.g. 
Communication, ‘Guidelines for the analysis of the balance between fishing capacity and fishing 
opportunities according to Art 22 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and the 
Council on the Common Fisheries Policy’ COM/2014/0545. 
29  See Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P Dansk 
Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I-5425 (EU:C:2005:408), [211]; Case C-75/05 P 
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Nevertheless, it remains difficult to determine when guidance documents create new 
legal obligations or are liable to bind the Commission’s own discretion by force of 
general legal principles of law, and when they are only internal guidelines not intended 
to have legal effects.30 The capacity such acts have to shape both Member States’ 
implementing actions and the conduct of legal persons raises concerns regarding the 
procedural norms they would be subject to, in particular to the extent that they may 
largely fall outside the scope of judicial review.31 The balance between the flexibility 
that, within the legal limits of its authority, the EU executive should have to perform 
its functions adequately, and the application of procedural rules or general principles of 
law that would structure their discretion is particularly delicate and difficult to strike in 
this case.32 Arguably, in view of their potential effects, the making of such acts should 
be subject to a minimum level of formality, which some EU agencies already follow, 
and to guarantees that would ensure that guidance is not a means of circumventing 
existing procedures and the guarantees they enshrine. 33 
Rule-making not only may come in different forms, but also may be adopted by 
different authors, unilaterally or in collaborative forms, as may be the case with some 
informal guidance, and with private standards that enjoy a presumption of compliance. 
Significantly, EU agencies also have rule-making powers. While not all agencies have 
the formal competence to adopt rules, quite a few regulate their respective sectors via 
informal regulatory instruments (such as best practices).34 In addition, some participate 
                                                        
Germany and Others v Kronofrance, EU:C:2008:482,[60]; Case T-304/08 Smurfit Kappa Group plc v 
Commission EU:T:2012:351, [84]. See, further, Scott (n 28) 339–42. 
30 Scott (n 28) 342–43. An additional obstacle to review is the authorship of these acts, Scott, ibid, 337–
39. 
31 Ibid, 346. Scott addresses in particular the risk that guidance may deviate from the wording and telos 
of the legislative acts the implementation of which they are intended to facilitate. 
32 See ReNEUAL – Book II (explanations) (n 3). 
33 Scott (n 28) 351–52.  
34 E.g. ECHA provides ‘technical and scientific guidance and tools where appropriate for the operation 
of [the Chemicals Regulation] in particular to assist the development of chemical safety reports … by 
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in the process of making legally binding non-legislative rules.35 The financial agencies, 
in particular, combine both types of power and, as many commentators have noted, 
stretch the rule-making powers of agencies in an unprecedented way.36  
These selected examples indicate the broad range of normative acts that support 
the expanding administrative functions of the EU, loosely understood as those that 
provide criteria to apply and adjust the content of legislative acts or of Treaty provisions 
to concrete situations.37 They point both to the substantive relevance of executive rule-
making in EU law and to the difficulties of placing these various acts under a single set 
of procedural rules that would shape them in view of the Treaty-based principles and 
of the legal requirements that stem from the Courts’ case law.38  
3. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMING OF EU RULE-MAKING 
(a) Constitutional Change, Normative Promise and Legal-Institutional Practice 
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced, for the first time at Treaty level, the organic and 
procedural distinction between legislative and non-legislative rules, which previous 
case law and institutional practice had carved out. It also defined provisions on 
democratic principles. As ‘founding’ principles, they ought to imbue the functioning of 
the EU political system, including the procedures through which the EU adopts 
                                                        
industry and especially by SMEs’ (Art 77(2)(g) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006, OJ L 396/1, 
30.12.2006). 
35 E Chiti, ‘European Agencies' Rulemaking: Powers, Procedures and Assessment’ (2013) 19 ELJ 93, 
99–100. 
36 See, e.g., M Busuioc, ‘Rule-Making by the European Financial Supervisory Authorities: walking a 
tight rope’ (2013) 19 ELJ 111, 114. See further Leino, Chap 9 in this volume. 
37 Curtin, Hoffman and Mendes (n 3) 2. On the difficulties of identifying an executive function in the 
EU, see D Ritleng, ‘L’identification de la fonction exécutive dans l’Union’ in J de la Rochère (ed), 
L’éxecution du droit de l’Union, entre mécanismes communautaires et droits nationaux (Bruylant 2009) 
pp. 27-51..  
38 See explanations of ReNEUAL Model rules – Book II, in particular 41, 50–53. See also Curtin, 
Hoffman and Mendes (n 3) (arguing that executive rule-making should concretize constitutional values 
and principles, rather than being shaped mainly by result-oriented choices) 
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executive rules.39 Those provisions endorse transparency and participation as part of 
the democratic foundations of the EU. 40  The Treaty also squarely addresses the 
relationship between the EU institutions and citizens (Articles 9 and 11 TEU).  
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of these Treaty provisions, both their systematic 
insertion in the Treaty and their wording acknowledge (in the case of transparency) and 
trigger (in the case of participation) a normative understanding of these principles as 
dimensions of democracy, which is qualitatively different from their understanding as 
good governance practices.41 Transparency and participation ought to enable citizens 
and their representative associations to engage in the definition and implementation of 
public policies and to voice their rights and legally protected interests, in equal terms 
(Article 9 TEU). In this perspective, the emphasis is placed on these principles’ ability 
to structure the relationship between public authority and those subject to it, rather than 
on their contribution to enhance problem-solving capacities and the effectiveness of 
rules – aspects which managerial theories of public administration would tend to 
emphasize. 
Arguably, these Treaty provisions constitute normative yardsticks that ought to 
frame and constrain the exercise of authority in the EU and, hence, justify rethinking 
the existing approach to rule-making procedures in the EU as essentially a matter of the 
                                                        
39 On founding principles, see A von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles’ in A von Bogdandy and J Bast 
(eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 2010) in particular at 21–23. On the 
ability of the Treaty provisions on democracy to frame the procedures leading to the adoption of 
delegated and implementing acts, see Mendes (n 4) in particular, Section 11.4. 
40 Transparency is a condition of the fulfilment of democracy (Arts 10(3) TEU and 15(1) TFEU). 
Participation in decision-making beyond representative institutions ought to become a complementary 
source of democratic legitimacy. See, further, J Mendes, ‘Participation and the Role of Law after Lisbon: 
A Legal View on Article 11 TEU’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 1849, 1778–79. 
41  The argument is developed with regard to participation in Mendes ibid, in particular 1861–63. 
Stressing the normative demand for change does not deny the risks of conflating interest representation 
with participatory democracy or of the possible shallow legitimating effects of transparency – see further 
Mendes (n 4) Section 11.4.2. The democratic dimension of transparency had been stated in Judgment in 
Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Turco v Council of Ministers EU:C:2008:374. 
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horizontal inter-institutional balances and vertical divisions of executive authority. In 
this view, the structural specificities that may explain the marginal role that procedural 
rules – in the ‘thick’ sense defended above42 – have in current EU executive procedures 
no longer justify maintaining the status quo. Procedures should not be designed only 
on the basis of sector-specific needs, to address institutional conflicts or administrative 
collaboration, without a systematic consideration of how the authority they embody 
ought to be structured in view of founding legal principles. At the same time, placing 
the emphasis on the constitutional framework of procedures ought neither conceal the 
difficulties that an eventual ‘proceduralization’ could entail, nor obfuscate the need for 
flexibility in carrying out administrative functions. 43  The main challenges lie in 
identifying the aspects of rule-making that should be regulated horizontally, the scope 
of horizontal rules and their combination with sector-specific regulation and specific 
types of acts in a way that would not stifle the effectiveness of rule-making while still 
not losing sight of the way public authority should be framed within the current 
constitutional framework. Addressing these issues requires knowledge about the scope 
of current rules and institutional practices to ascertain how distanced existing rules and 
practices may be from the normative requirements of constitutional principles. This is 
a necessary step to inform the discussion on the role that a general law on the 
administrative procedure could have with regard to executive rule-making. 
Transparency strictu senso: access to administrative documents 
From a normative standpoint, transparency is a way of securing ‘a more significant role 
for citizens in the decision-making process and [ensuring] that the administration acts 
with greater propriety, efficiency and responsibility vis-à-vis the citizens in a 
                                                        
42 Section 2(a). 
43 Stressing that EU procedures combine ‘sturdiness with flexibility’, see C Harlow and R Rawlings, 
Process and Procedure in the EU Administration (Hart Publishing 2014) 8. 
 
 
 14 
democratic system’.44 The strongest statement of the Court in this regard was perhaps 
made in the Turco judgment, where the Court upheld ‘the democratic right of European 
citizens to scrutinize the information which has formed the basis of a legislative act’.45  
The emphasis on the relevance of transparency specifically in legislative 
procedure enabled the Court to contrast the wide access to legislative documents with 
a more restrictive approach to access to documents pertaining to administrative 
activities. In some cases, the Court established general presumptions of non-disclosure 
that apply to categories of administrative documents. The institutions applying an 
exception to access (Article 4 of Regulation 1049/2001) may rely on such 
presumptions, instead of demonstrating a specific and effective harm and a reasonably 
foreseeable risk to the interests protected by the exceptions (as would follow from 
Turco).46 General presumptions are intended to preserve ‘the integrity of the conduct 
of the procedure … by limiting intervention by third parties’.47 In the first cases where 
general presumptions were established, these served to safeguard the application of 
specific regimes on access to file, where sectoral legislation defined the conditions 
                                                        
44 Case T-211/00 Kuijer v Council EU:T:2002:30, [52]. And see Regulation 1049/2001, preamble recitals 
1 and 2 (referring, more broadly, to openness), and recital 6 (making an explicit reference to delegated 
powers). Judgment in Case C-353/99 P Council v Hautala EU:C:2001:66, [17]; Judgment in Joined 
Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, Turco v Council of Ministers, [67] (see also [45, 46, 59 and 67]; Case 
T-233/09 Access Info Europe v Council, EU:T:2011:105, [69]; see also Case C-280/11 Council v Access 
Info Europe, EU:C:2013:671, [83]. 
45 Turco ibid. See Access Info Europe ibid, [33].  
46 See, e.g., Case C-139/07 P Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau EU:C:2010:376, [61] (state 
aids); Case C-404/10 P Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob, EU:C:2012:393, [123] and C-477/10 P 
Commission v Agrofert Holding, EU:C:2012:394, [64] (mergers); and Case C-365/12 P Commission v 
EnBW EU:C:2014:112, [93] (Art 101 TFEU infringements); Case C-514/11 P, C-605/11 P LPN and 
Finland v Commission EU:C:2013:738, [65] (infringement procedures against Member States). For a 
discussion of some of these cases, see e.g., P Leino, ‘Just a Little Sunshine in the Rain: The 2010 Case 
Law of the European Court of Justice on Access to Documents’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 1215; J Mendes, 
‘Access to Administrative Documents: Losing Sight of Public Interest?’, paper presented at Transatlantic 
Conference on Transparency Research (Utrecht University, 7–9 June 2012). 
47 Joined Cases T-424/14 and T-425/14 ClientEarth v Commission EU:T:2015:848, [67]. 
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under which third parties could have access to bilateral procedures involving 
investigated undertakings or Member States, i.e. single case decision-making.  
To the author’s knowledge, the distinction between legislative and non-
legislative acts never applied to cases on access to documents produced in the making 
of general non-legislative acts.48 However, a 2015 judgment of the General Court on 
the disclosure of draft impact assessment reports (and of the related reports of the 
Impact Assessment Board) broke a new frontier on the scope of application of general 
presumptions of non-disclosure. The Court squarely upheld the application of a general 
presumption that protects the Commission’s space to think in ongoing decision-making 
procedures ‘regardless of the nature – legislative or otherwise – of the proposal 
envisaged by the Commission’.49 The sweeping way in which the Court admitted a 
general presumption as virtually applicable to any ongoing decision-making procedures 
of the Commission is noteworthy. The Court grounded the presumption in the 
Commission’s independence and in its Treaty mandate to act in the general interest.50 
This position contrasts starkly with the purpose of ‘widest possible access’ of the 
regulation on access to documents, which arguably requires a restrictive interpretation 
of the exceptions to access. Nevertheless, the Court sought to safeguard the democratic 
rationale of disclosure in legislative procedures, by pointing out that the Commission 
does not act in a legislative capacity when it prepares or develops a proposal for an act, 
‘even a legislative act’.51 It acts in the capacity of an independent institution that, 
because of its role to promote the general interest, must act insulated from external 
                                                        
48 E.g. Case T-121/05 Borax v Commission EU:T:2009:64, [69] on non-legislative regulatory acts seems 
to confirm this point. See, in the context of international negotiations, the Opinion of AG Sharpston, in 
Case C-350/12 P Council v In ’t Veld EU:C:2014:88 (in particular [71]–[72]).  
49 Joined Cases T-424/14 and T-425/14 ClientEarth v Commission at [50], [52], [68]–[75], [76]–[78], 
[100]. 
50 ClientEarth v Commission [78]–[84]. 
51 Ibid, [102]–[03]. 
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pressures that could ‘compel the Commission to adopt, amend or abandon a policy 
initiative’ and hinder the ‘atmosphere of trust during discussions’.52  
Without questioning that moments of transparency ought to be balanced with 
moments of closed internal deliberations during decision-making procedures, this 
judgment arguably goes a step too far, in particular by anchoring the presumption on 
the institutional features of the Commission. The moments of interaction of the 
institutions with interested parties and the public during rule-making procedures, which 
the Commission defines via public consultations during impact assessments,53 seem to 
be the only ones that the Court is willing to acknowledge as points of access to an 
otherwise virtually closed procedure. At stake in this case seem to have been possible 
shortcomings of the impact assessment procedure and the applicant’s desire to 
complement the information that the Commission held.54 This possibility could indeed 
amount to an undesirable ‘exercise of targeted influence’, which the Court rightly 
intended to avoid.55 It would have given Client Earth access to the procedure after the 
closure of impact assessment. Yet, the Court ignores that the Commission itself keeps 
its door open to receiving input from interested parties outside public consultations.56 
One may query whether the balance between, on the one hand, the need to preserve the 
space of decision-making of the Commission and, on the other, the moments of access 
to documents and to the procedure should not be regulated in a different way, e.g. via 
general rules that would concretize the exceptions on the regulation on access to 
                                                        
52 Ibid, [51], [52], [95], [115]. 
53 Section 3(a) 
54 ClientEarth v Commission [130], [150]. 
55 Ibid, [96]. 
56 The 2015 guidelines on impact assessment distinguish between ‘consultations’, which are subject to 
the minimum standards of consultation, from ‘feedback’ processes, which are not subject to those 
standards (Commission Staff Working Document, Better Regulation Guidelines COM (2015) 215 final, 
p. 66, footnote 86). 
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documents and would balance them against the principle of democracy as enshrined in 
the Treaty. 
Participation in rule-making: no-law’s land  
Participation in EU rule-making has been and largely remains a principle of governance 
valued in its ability to enhance problem-solving capacities, process efficiency and 
policy outcomes.57 Rather than a principle of democracy, which postulates that citizens 
or their representatives are given voice and equal treatment, in a way that could 
arguably place external constraints on the way public authority is exercised, 
participation is seen as a means of asking ‘the right people … the right questions about 
the right initiatives, so as to feed into Commission decision-making in an efficient 
manner’.58 There seems to be little, if any, institutional awareness of the normative 
implications entailed in the way in which the Treaty frames participation.59 
Giving voice and equal treatment would arguably require a set of binding 
procedural rules that would not only shape procedures accordingly, but also ensure the 
fulfilment of these requirements. A legal approach to participation has however been 
straightforwardly dismissed by the Court. The reference judgment in this respect 
remains Atlanta. Here, the Court held that the only obligations of consultation 
impinging on the EU institutions are those specifically envisaged in the relevant 
provisions of the Treaties. In the Court’s view, ‘the fundamental democratic principle 
that the people should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a 
representative assembly’ excludes direct participation in rule-making procedures 
                                                        
57 J Mendes Participation in EU Rulemaking. A Rights-Based Approach (OUP 2011) Chap 3. 
58 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Review of the Commission Consultation Policy’, SWD(2012) 
422 final, Strasbourg (12.12.2012) 10. 
59 See the Commission’s reply to Question for written answer to the Commission, Gilles Pargneaux 
(S&D), E-005223/2012, 23 May 2012, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2012-
005223&format=XML&language=EN). 
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except where duties of consultation are explicitly enshrined in a Treaty or legislative 
provision. 60 When and how participation procedures should be envisaged is a matter 
for the Member States and for the EU legislator. The Court’s position on this matter 
combined with the EU legislator’s resistances in defining procedural rules for executive 
rule-making mean that, with the exception of rare sector-specific rules, there are 
virtually no participation rights in EU rule-making that would fulfil the function that 
notice and comment has had in US administrative law.61  
Arguably, the above-mentioned arguments that the Court invoked in Atlanta no 
longer hold in view of Article 11 TEU. Yet, to the author’s knowledge the Court has 
not been faced with legal claims based on this Treaty Article which could have led it to 
revisit its case law. One legal reason is the conditions to challenge acts of general 
scope. 62  A related legal reason is the way applicants formulate their claims of 
participation. Most likely, they are directed at protecting their individual interests in the 
face of an act that they consider to have been harmful to their rights or legally protected 
interests. In this sense, they are much more in line with the rationale of the right to be 
heard in individual decision-making, than with a democratic rationale of enabling any 
legal or natural person to voice interests that the applicable legal norms protect and that, 
accordingly, administrative decision-makers need to pursue when adopting legal acts. 
While it may not be easy to dissociate one rationale from the other,63 in the absence of 
collective actions, Court actions are likely to channel the individual dimension of 
                                                        
60  Case T-521/93 Atlanta and Others v European Community EU:T:1996:18471; Case C-104/97 P 
Atlanta v European Community EU:C:1999:498, [38]. On the latter argument, see also Case T-135/96 
UEAPME v Council [1998] ECR II-2335, [88]. For an analysis of Atlanta, see Mendes (n 57) Chap 5 
and Mendes (n 40) 1874–75. 
61 E.g. R Stewart, ‘Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century’ (2003) 78 New York University Law 
Review 436, 437. 
62 Contrary to what I had anticipated in Mendes (n 40) 1873 et seq, the loosening of standing criteria 
after Lisbon does not appear to have had an impact on the possibility of participation claims reaching the 
Court. But see further Kieran Bradley, Chap 17 in this volume. 
63 See Mendes ibid, 1864. 
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participation. The emphasis on the protection of the individual’s interests stands in 
contrast with the collective dimension that the democratic meaning of participation 
conveys, as an active engagement in public action.64  The individual dimension is 
further enhanced by the configuration of the right to be heard as a fundamental right 
(Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights). Where relied on by applicants, 
the Court has rejected extending the scope of this fundamental right to acts of general 
application, in accordance with a third argument that the Court had already invoked in 
Atlanta: ‘the right to be heard in an administrative procedure affecting a specific person 
cannot be transposed to the context of a legislative process leading to the adoption of 
general laws’.65 The extension of this reasoning to non-legislative acts is problematic, 
to say the least.66 Yet, in the absence of legal rules that would frame participation in a 
way that could concretize it as a founding legal principle in the sense of Article 11 TEU, 
there are good reasons to avoid that individual rights of participation (that would be 
established via judicial means) excessively constrain the discretion of administrative 
decision-makers in adopting acts of general scope. It follows that both for positive legal 
reasons, pertaining to the current design of rules of standing, and for normative legal 
reasons, judicial action is not the suitable means to enforce the principle of participation 
as a dimension of democracy that Article 11 TEU enshrines. It would be primarily the 
task of the legislator, which has been silent in this respect and is likely to remain so.67 
Participation in rule-making: the better regulation agenda 
                                                        
64 On how, from this perspective, participation could complement representation, see Mendes (n 4) 
Section 11.4.2. 
65 Case T-521/93 Atlanta and Others v European Community EU:T:1996:184, [70], [71] upheld on 
appeal in Case C-104/97 P Atlanta v European Community EU:C:1999:498,[31]–[40]. The Court 
recently reiterated this argument in Case T-296/12 The Health Food Manufacturers' Association and 
Others v Commission EU:T:2015:375, [98], [154], [178]. 
66 See for further detail, Mendes (n 57) Chap 5. 
67 See critically, Mendes (n 4) Section 11.4.3. And see Section 5 below. 
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In view of the lack of a legal framework, participation in executive rule-making does 
not formally possess a control function such as would be characteristic of administrative 
law procedures, as a means to structure the discretion of the Commission in the 
adoption of such acts. The EU institutional practice of consultations, in particular those 
that the Commission undertakes in the context of impact assessments, could fill this 
gap. Consultations, as part of impact assessment procedures, have now been explicitly 
extended to delegated and implementing acts. Where the conditions exist that may 
justify impact assessments (i.e. the possibility of ‘significant economic, environmental 
or social impacts’), these should be ‘carried out for both legislative and non-legislative 
initiatives as well as delegated acts and implementing measures’.68 It thus seems more 
likely that impact assessments will become a norm also at this level of rule-making, 
depending on the potential significance of these acts. Consultations are, now as before, 
part thereof.69 Yet, without denying the positive aspects of this practice, there are limits 
to the functional equivalence of such practices with legal rules that would introduce a 
‘notice and comment’ type of procedure in line with the normative meaning of Article 
11 TEU.70  
While the intention to extend the scope of consultations appears to be in tune 
with the wording of Article 11(3) TEU, nothing in the Commission’s guidelines 
indicates that such processes could have a democratic meaning. They have a different 
rationale. Consultations occur in the context of impact assessments, which are a tool to 
                                                        
68 Better Regulation Guidelines (n 56), 17 (emphasis added). 
69 Ibid. In addition, the same guidelines indicate that ‘stakeholder consultations can in principle take 
place throughout the whole policy cycle. However, stakeholder consultations can only be launched for 
initiatives which have received political validation by the appropriate political level (cf. Chapter II on 
Planning)’. 
70 On the advantages of the current practices, see P Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP 2012); Harlow 
and Rawlings (n 43). The Court advanced an argument of equivalence in Case T-296/12 The Health 
Food Manufacturers' Association (n 65) at  [181]. 
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ensure evidence-based policy-making, or of related means of policy evaluation.71 The 
way the Commission describes the advantages of stakeholders’ consultations reveals 
the underlying ‘problem-solving approach’ to participation: consultations involve those 
‘who will be directly impacted by the policy’ and ‘those who are involved in ensuring 
its correct application’; it can improve the ‘evidence-base’ of policy-making; it can 
‘avoid problems later and promote greater acceptance of the policy 
initiative/intervention’. 72 , 73  This approach arguably stands in contrast with the 
democratic perspective on participation that the systematic insertion of Article 11 in the 
Treaty conveys.74 The purpose is not to ensure equal voice (in terms of access and 
treatment) to those interested in having a say in public action.  
The rationale of impact assessment indicates that the basic reference for voice 
is the expert, not the person. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the guidelines reveal 
a concern for inclusiveness of those consulted. 75  In addition, ‘open public 
consultations’ are purported to ‘foster transparency and accountability’, which 
indicates that participation would have an external control function, or at least create 
the conditions to exercise such control.76 Such an external perspective on participation 
is, however, contradicted by the second function attributed to open public consultations: 
‘ensure broadest public validation and support for an initiative’.77 This specification 
                                                        
71 In the words of the Commission, ‘impact assessment is about gathering and analysing evidence to 
support policymaking’, p. 16. 
72 Better Regulation Guidelines 2015 (n 56) 63–64. Another category of stakeholder indicated is those 
‘who have a stated interest in the policy’, which may open up the scope of those consulted to include 
also those persons who may not have direct expertise in the matter (ibid, 74). 
73 Contrary to prior documents of the Commission on these matters, there is no rhetoric of bringing 
‘citizens closer to the Union’, indicating a distancing of the Commission from its earlier governance 
agenda. For a critical note on such rhetoric, see K Armstrong, ‘Rediscovering Civil Society: The 
European Union and the White Paper on Governance (2002) 8 ELJ 102. 
74 See Mendes ‘Participation and the role of law’ (n 40). 
75 Better Regulation Guidelines 2015 (n 56) 73–76. 
76 Ibid, 76, emphasis added. 
77 Ibid, 76, emphasis added. 
 
 
 22 
again indicates an approach to participation as an instrument to support the governance 
process, rather than as a means to ensure that the decision-makers have a suitable 
representation of the legally protected interests that their decisions may affect and 
weigh such interests in line with the public interests that the legislator defined in the 
parent act. This perspective would require giving voice irrespective of regulatory 
preferences – an aspect that the better regulation approach to participation may not 
ensure. 
In addition, the long list of exceptions to ‘public consultations’ on delegated 
and implementing acts confirms the broad discretion that the Commission retains in 
defining the opportunities of participation.78 Among other exceptions, consultations in 
delegated and implementing acts will not be carried out in instances where the 
Commission has ‘no (or limited) margin of discretion’. What may involve limited 
discretion may be disputed, and may be understood extensively. In particular, this 
category includes ‘acts implementing international standards into EU law’. This 
exception is potentially quite far-reaching given the varied instances of international 
regulatory cooperation in which standards defined by global regulatory bodies (often 
with the agreement of the Commission) become binding on the EU.79  
(b) Selected Procedural Duties 
The above indicates that there remains an important gap between the normative 
promises that the Treaty conveys in terms of the principles that should structure the 
action of the EU institutions, including at the executive level, and existing institutional 
practices. The provisions on the democratic principles of the Treaty emphasize the 
relationships between the EU institutions (and bodies) and the world outside the inter-
                                                        
78 Ibid, 67–68. 
79 E.g, J Mendes, ‘EU Law and Global Regulatory Regimes: Hollowing Out Procedural Standards?’ 
(2012) 10 Internatioanl Journal of Constitutional Law 988. 
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organic (Member State–EU) flow of decision-making. This aspect is further reflected 
in other Treaty provisions, which indicate openness as a normative feature of the work 
of the EU institutions and bodies (Articles 15(1) and 298(1) TFEU). Such constitutional 
framing justifies the development of an administrative law of rule-making procedures, 
which, beyond providing a structure to the multiple intermediary acts of various entities 
that rule-making requires, would also shape the relationships between the makers of 
legal acts, legally affected persons and citizens.80 Existing procedural duties that apply 
to EU rule-making by force of general rules or principles may perform this function: 
the duty to give reasons and the duty of careful and impartial examination. This section 
analyses the way in which these duties apply to executive rule-making, and thereby, 
provides an illustration of existing administrative controls. 
The duty to give reasons 
The duty to give reasons applies to all legal acts of the Union, irrespective of its 
legislative or executive nature, general or individual scope (Article 296(2) TFEU). This 
duty has a three-fold function in EU law, succinctly stated early on by the Court: it 
‘seeks to give an opportunity to the parties of defending their rights, to the Court of 
exercising its supervisory functions and to the Member States and to all interested 
nationals of ascertaining the circumstances in which the [institutions have] applied the 
Treaty’.81 As such, it enables Member States and other persons concerned to understand 
why a measure has been adopted. This aspect is relevant not only from a perspective of 
transparency, but also of control. It is arguably the main reason why this duty features 
in the Treaties since the 1950s.82 The duty to give reasons also helps the decision-maker 
                                                        
80 Curtin, Hoffman, Mendes (n 3); Mendes (n 4). 
81  Case 24/62 Germany v Commission EU:C:1963:14, 69. See, inter alia Case T-257/04 Poland v 
Commission EU:T:2009:182, [214], concerning a Commission regulation regarding agriculture markets 
adopted on the basis of the 2004 Accession Treaty. 
82 As suggested by J Schwarze, European Administrative Law (rev. ed. Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 1401. 
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in defining the content of the act, insofar as the legal requirement to give reasons for 
the choices taken requires a consideration of the various options available.83 
The Court has since long established that the scope of this duty ‘must be 
appropriate to the act at issue’, stressing that ‘it is not necessary for the reasoning to go 
into all the relevant facts and points of law’ and that compliance with the duty to give 
reasons ‘must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and 
to all the legal rules governing the matter in question’.84 This standard is thus flexible 
enough to lead to different types of requirement, depending also on the nature of the 
act at issue. For acts of a general scope, the Court has repeatedly held that the duty to 
give reasons is complied with if it ‘clearly discloses the essential objective pursued by 
the institution’, adding that ‘it would be unreasonable to require a specific statement of 
reasons for each of the technical choices’ such acts entail, or ‘the often very numerous 
and complex matters of fact or of law dealt with in the regulations’.85 The way in which 
the Court reviews compliance with the duty to state reasons, in line with this standard, 
varies. In some cases, the Court succinctly considers that the institution has justified its 
choice and hence satisfied the requisite standard;86 in other cases, the Court verifies in 
some detail if the reasons are suitable in view of the legal requirements by which the 
institution was bound.87 Another criterion by which the EU Courts assesses compliance 
with the duty to give reasons, also with regard to measures of general application, is the 
                                                        
83 Ibid, 1401.  
84 See, e.g., Case T-89/00 Europe Chemi-Con (Deutschland) GmbH v Counci EU:T:2002:213, [65] 
(antidumping); Case C-221/09 AJD Tuna Ltd EU:C:2011:153, [58] (Common fisheries policy). 
Emphasis added. 
85 See, e.g., Joined Cases 292 and 293/81 Société Jean Lion EU:C:1982:375, 3898; Case T-89/00 Europe 
Chemi-Con (Deutschland) GmbH v Council EU:T:2002:213, [66] (antidumping); Case C-221/09 AJD 
Tuna Ltd, [59] (common fisheries policy). 
86 E.g. Case T-89/00 Europe Chemi-Con (Deutschland) GmbH v Council, [67] (antidumping). 
87 Case C-221/09 AJD Tuna Ltd [62-67] (common fisheries policy). 
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ability of the statement of reasons to enable interested parties to understand the 
justification of the act at stake.88  
The statement of reasons of implementing acts – in the broad sense the term had 
before the Treaty of Lisbon – is assessed on the basis of an additional criterion: the 
relationship between the basic and the implementing act may justify a succinct 
statement of the latter. The reference to the basic act may be sufficient to clarify the 
reasons for the adoption of the implementing act, if the the basic act provides criteria 
on the content of the implementing act. 89 The Court then assesses the adequacy of the 
statement of reasons given by reference to the provisions of the main act.90 The same 
line of reasoning may apply to acts that are not in a subordinate relationship, but that 
have been adopted in a given legislative context, which, on the whole, may be sufficient 
to clarify succinct reasons given by the author of the act.91 In addition, when the act at 
issue is consistent with previous measures a succinct statement of reasons accompanied 
by reference to other acts may suffice, unless that act ‘goes appreciably further’ than 
those measures.92  
The Court’s careful approach in using its power of review of the duty to give 
reasons indicates that it intends to maintain, as far as possible, the fragile distinction 
                                                        
88 Case T-296/12 The Health Food Manufacturers' Association v Commission (n 65) at [109]. In a 
different sense, but also supportive of the argument made above, Case C-445/00 Austria v Council at 
[50]. 
89  Case 230/78 Eridania-Zuccherifici nazionali et Società italiana per l’industria degli zuccheri 
EU:C:1979:216, [15]–[16]; Case C-328/00 Maria Weber and Martin Weber v Freistaat Bayern 
EU:C:2002:91, [42]–[45]; Case T-333/09 Poland v Commission EU:T:2012:449, [88]–[91]. 
90 Ibid at [89]. 
91 Joined Cases 292 and 293/81 Société Jean Lion and Others ECLI:EU:C:1982:375, 3898. See also 
Opinion of AG Verloren van Themaat delivered on 7 October 1982, in Société Jean Lion and Others, 
3924–25. 
92 E.g. Case 73/74 Groupement des fabricants de papiers peints de Belgique and Others v Commission 
EU:C:1975:160, [31]; Case C-295/07 P Commission v Département du Loiret EU:C:2008:707, [44]; 
Case C-228/99 Silos e Mangimi Martini SpA v Ministero delle Finanze EU:C:2001:599, [28]. In this case 
the Court held at [30] that the challenged regulation departed from ‘the Commission’s usual practice’ 
and considered that the brief reasons added to the references to previous acts did not suffice as a statement 
of reasons.  
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between reviewing process requirements and the substantive legality of a measure.93 
The Court is in principle unwilling to perform a hard look review on the basis of reason-
giving. An ‘ossification’ of rule-making, which has concerned American scholarship, 
as a result of judicial review is arguably unlikely in the EU.94 For the same reason, it is 
unlikely that a possible restatement of this case law in a general law of the 
administrative procedure would diminish the flexibility that the Court now recognizes 
to the institutions when providing reasons for acts of general scope.  
The duty of care 
The inclusion of the duty of care (i.e. careful and impartial examination) in this chapter 
could seem prima facie misplaced. The duty of care refers to the process of collecting 
the information needed to appraise the relevant factual and legal aspects of a given 
situation, and the manner in which such information is assessed.95 It has a protective 
dimension, since it allows the EU Courts, in particular the General Court, to challenge 
the legality of administrative acts adopted on the basis of insufficient or inadequate 
information.96 Yet, this same protective dimension has led the Courts to acknowledge 
the limits of extending this duty beyond the limits of adjudicatory procedures. The 
question then is whether and how this duty applies to executive rule-making.  
                                                        
93  E.g., Case T-231/06 T-237/06 Netherlands and Nederlandse Omroep Stichting v Commission 
EU:T:2010:525, [79]; Case C-221/09 AJD Tuna (n 84) at [60]. 
94  E.g. T McGarity, ‘The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor 
Seidenfeld’ (1997) 75 Texas Law Review 525. 
 
95 Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte EU:C:1991:438 [14]; 
Case T-369/03 Arizona Chemical and Others v Commission EU:T:2005:458, [85]; Judgment in Case T-
210/02 British Aggregates v Commission EU:T:2006:253, [178]; Case T-333/10 Animal Trading 
Company Others v Commission EU:T:2013:451, [84]. The following draws on J Mendes, ‘Discretion, 
Care and Public Interests in the EU Administration: Probing the Limits of Law’ (2016) 52 CML Rev 1. 
On the duty of care, see H-P Nehl, Principles of Administrative Procedure in EC Law (Hart Publishing 
1999). 
96 The landmark cases are Case C-16/90 Eugene Nolle (anti-dumping); Case C-269/90, TUM (customs).  
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The EU Courts have indicated the relevance of the duty of care in relation to 
acts of general application. One example is Animal Trading Company concerning a 
decision to suspend imports of products in view of a serious threat to health. This was 
an action for non-contractual liability where the duty of care functioned as an individual 
procedural guarantee of the companies that had been affected by a general decision 
addressed to Member States.97  In other cases, the General Court has held that, in 
procedures leading up to acts of general application, the duty of care applies as ‘an 
objective procedural guarantee arising from an absolute and unconditional obligation 
on the [EU] institution relating to the drafting of [the act] and not the exercise of any 
individual right’.98 It is ‘imposed in the public interest’.99 In a similar vein, the General 
Court has denied that the duty of care could be a procedural guarantee invoked by 
complainants in state aid procedures – which, arguably, lead to acts of general scope.100 
In the case of T-Mobile, the Court of Justice reverted the judgment of the General Court 
by contesting its argument that the Commission’s obligation to undertake a diligent and 
impartial examination of a complaint would arise from the ‘right to sound 
administration of individual situations’.101 
The objective dimension of this duty has been translated, in the area of risk 
regulation, into the principles of excellence, transparency and independence that ought 
to guide scientific assessments of the Commission, the breach of which may be invoked 
in Court by individuals directly and individually concerned. 102  But beyond this 
                                                        
97 Case T-333/10 Animal Trading Company, [84]–[94]. 
98 Case T-369/03 Arizona Chemical, [86], [89] concerning the adaptation of a directive to technical 
progress.  
99 Ibid at [88]. 
100 E.g. Case T-210/02, British Aggregates, [177]. On the nature of state aid decisions, see, Mendes (n 
57) Chap 8. 
101 See Judgment of the Court of First Instance 30 January 2002, Case T-54/99 T-Mobile Austria GmbH 
v Commission EU:T:2002:20 [48]; Case C-141/02 P Commission v T-Mobile Austria GmbH 
EU:C:2005:98 [72] and Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro. 
102 See, e.g., Case T-369/03 Arizona Chemical, [88]. 
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precision, and outside the realm of risk regulation, the Courts did not elaborate further 
on what care could mean as part of proper administrative conduct. This is an aspect that 
should be concretized in developing an administrative law framing of EU executive 
rule-making.103  
4. EU EXECUTIVE RULE-MAKING AND LAW: ENTRENCHING OR 
CONSTRAINING AUTHORITY? 
Notwithstanding the specificities of the EU legal order, EU law has developed a set of 
constitutional and legal principles that arguably ought to frame the way in which 
executive rules are made. Procedures should heed the external effects that executive 
rules produce, and be conceived in a way that structures public authority accordingly, 
in addition to reflecting the evolving inter-institutional relations or defining a division 
of tasks or collaboration between the EU institutions and Member States. 
The general legal principles that apply to the procedures by which the EU adopts 
executive rules have been largely developed via case law. The EU Courts have defined 
their scope and the way in which they structure these procedures, also where general 
rules apply by force of legislative acts (namely, on access to documents). They have 
solidified existing institutional practices without examining them through the lens of a 
democratic rationale of transparency and participation that the Lisbon Treaty now 
enshrines. In the case of transparency, the argument that access to documents is a means 
of enabling citizens (and legal persons) to participate in the making of decisions that 
affect them has prevailed in access to legislative documents (i.e. pertaining to 
legislative procedures) to the detriment of access to administrative documents insofar 
                                                        
103 For a normative analysis of how this duty could be developed, see the quite different views defended 
in Curtin, Hoffman and Mendes (n 3) 14–15, and Mendes (n 95). See also the proposals in ReNEUAL 
Model rules – Book II, 3. 
 
 
 29 
as general presumptions of non-disclosure apply. The application of a general 
presumption of non-disclosure in the wide way in which it was admitted in ClientEarth 
virtually closes the procedure to access by interested persons or the public, except in 
the stages that the Commission itself considers it useful to have outside input and to the 
extent that it wishes to have such input.  
While it remains to be seen whether ClientEarth will become settled case law, 
the Courts’ position regarding participation in rule-making was defined in the 1990s 
and has stayed unchanged, notwithstanding the Lisbon Treaty provisions on 
democracy. As noted, given standing rules and litigants’ incentives to challenge 
executive rules, judicial action is not the most suitable avenue to concretize 
participation as a democratic principle in view of Article 11 TEU. At the same time, 
current institutional practices of participation, namely via impact assessments, can 
hardly be considered a functional equivalent to democratic participation, despite 
indications to the contrary in the case law.  
It follows from the above that the EU Courts’ case law, rather than shaping 
institutional practices in view of constitutional principles, is arguably entrenching 
institutional practices, maintaining the gap between principles and practices. This 
observation applies to participation and, in part at least, to access to documents. The 
case is different with regard to the duty to give reasons and to the duty of careful and 
impartial examination. The way the Court has shaped the duty to give reasons enables 
a control function that is important for the concretization of the Treaty principles (even 
if this duty serves also other rationales), while ensuring enough flexibility that avoids 
excessive procedural constraints. The duty of care may serve such a function, but the 
way it applies to rule-making still needs to be concretized.  
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The EU legislator would be better placed than the Courts to define a different 
way of structuring EU rule-making procedures, more heedful of democracy as a 
founding principle of the EU legal order. But there are also considerable obstacles to 
this avenue, for legal and institutional reasons.104 First, there are doubts on whether 
Article 298(2) TFEU could serve as a legal basis for a law on administrative procedure, 
which would include rule-making. One may question to what extent the adoption of 
delegated and implementing acts, as categories of legal acts that procedural rules on 
rule-making would cover, is a task of the ‘European administration’ in the sense of 
Article 298(1) TFEU. Doubts may also arise on whether Articles 290 and 291 TFEU 
exhaust the legal framework that defines the rules to which acts should be subject. Both 
are surmountable objections.105 More difficult to overcome are the resistances of the 
institutions with legislative power. A legislative initiative depends formally on the 
Commission, whose powers would be constrained by effect of such a law. The 
Commission’s proposal that preceded the inter-institutional agreement on better 
lawmaking is revealing of its position on this matter. It made its way to the final text of 
the agreement, which specifies, first, that the procedures for the adoption of a delegated 
act are those agreed upon in the new ‘common understanding’ and in that agreement; 
and, second, in relation to implementing acts, that the institutions agree to ‘refrain from 
adding, in Union legislation, procedural requirements, sui generis procedures or 
additional roles for committees, other than those set out in [the comitology 
regulation]’.106 It is likely that also the Council would not have enough incentives to 
                                                        
104 On these, see P Craig, ‘A General Law on Administrative Procedure, Legislative Competence and 
Judicial Competence’ (2013) 19 European Public Law 503. 
105 I owe those two points to a discussion with Herwig Hoffman. On my objections, see J Mendes, 
‘Delegated and Implementing Rule-Making: Proceduralisation and Constitutional Design’ (2013) 19 ELJ 
22 albeit without referring to the legal basis, and J Mendes (n 4) Section 11.4.3. 
106 See Communication from the Commission, ‘Proposal for an Interinstitutional Agreement on Better 
Regulation’, COM (2015)216 final, 19.5.2015, points 22 and 23; Inter-institutional Agreement on Better 
Lawmaking (OJ L 123/1, 12.5.2016), points 28 and 30. 
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pass a procedural law applicable to rule-making.107 The positions of the Commission 
and of the Council may partially explain the silence of the Parliament in this regard.108 
In addition to legal issues and institutional resistances, the variety of forms in which 
executive rules may be adopted in the EU is a challenge to the definition of general 
rules of procedure that would concretize constitutional principles in a horizontal way. 
Suggesting concrete rules means struggling with complex trade-offs and entails costs 
and imbalances that need to be carefully considered. However, these should be seen as 
a part of a discussion on procedural design that should be constitutionally informed, 
rather than as insurmountable obstacles to the definition of procedural rules. 
At the same time that the EU legislator is avoiding the definition of 
constitutionally informed procedural rules for the adoption of EU rule-making, a further 
entrenchment of current institutional practices may occur via international regulatory 
cooperation, in particular under a putative Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). The current Commission’s textual proposal on regulatory 
cooperation includes impact assessment procedures and consultations, which would 
apply to domestic procedures, very much in line with the Commission’s current 
practices.109 Some of the novelties of the Commission’s better law-making agenda 
announced in May 2015, in particular the extension of impact assessments, including 
consultations, to delegated and implementing acts may be a reaction to the TTIP 
                                                        
107 Generally, on incentives of legislators in passing laws on the administrative procedure, see S Rose-
Ackerman ‘Democratic Legitimacy and Executive Rulemaking: Positive Political Theory in 
Comparative Public Law’ in J Mendes and I Venzke (eds), Allocating Authority: Who Should Do What 
in European and International Law? Hart Publishing (forthcoming)  
108 See, further, J Mendes (n 4) Section 11.4.3, on the Parliament’s Resolution of 2013. See also Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Administrative Procedure of the 
European Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, discussed at the Hearing of the Committee 
on Legal Affairs (28 January 2016), available at 
http://www.emeeting.europarl.europa.eu/committees/agenda/201601/JURI/JURI%282016%290128_1/
sitt-2202268); Galetta et al  ‘The context and legal elements’ (2015) Study for the Juri Committee, at 16. 
109  Textual Proposal on Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP, May 2015, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153403.pdf.  
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negotiations. They were arguably seen as a means of bridging the regulatory differences 
between the EU and the US in what comes to executive rule-making, in particular the 
lack of a notice and comment procedure applicable to EU rule-making. This 
modification to EU procedures will most likely remain (at least until a further reform 
of better regulation), irrespective of the fate of TTIP. While the shortcomings of such a 
path have been pointed out above, the continuity between the Commission’s better 
regulation agenda and its proposals for regulatory cooperation is noteworthy. If this 
agreement were concluded in the terms the Commission proposed, it would become 
binding law, incorporated in EU law, and it would define in some respects at least the 
procedural rules for EU executive rule-making (and law-making). In this scenario, these 
rules would be shaped by an international agreement on trade and investment 
liberalization, relying on regulatory practices largely defined by executive actors. 
It follows that EU executive rule-making may be at a watershed point. If 
governed by a law on the administrative procedure that would concretise the Treaty 
provisions on democracy, this could be a first step to constitutionalizing rule-making. 
Executive rule-making would then be shaped by constitutional principles. This unlikely 
scenario contrasts with the trend, visible in the Courts’ case law, to entrench existing 
institutional practices along the lines of better regulation, as defined mainly by the 
Commission. The EU’s rule-making procedures are largely shaped by the Commission 
practices, in view of functional needs of regulation, in contrast to the US rule-making 
procedures, where, in addition to regulatory impact assessments, the Administrative 
Procedural Act of 1946 defines the terms of rule-making in a way that - formally at 
least - ensures equal voice and treatment to any person interested in having a say in the 
procedure and the ancillary means of redress. 
 
